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INTRODUCTION
Even the casual student of urban affairs must be impressed by the fact that
hardly a day passes without his being subjected to some solemn pronouncement
indicating that the vigor, indeed even survival, of our economy is in grave danger
if something is not done about the urban crisis. There is no urban crisis today.
There are serious problems, but most metropolitan areas will continue to thrive and
grow for the foreseeable future. As Raymond Vernon has noted, "To most Ameri-
cans, the personal experience of urban living seems not one of personal retrogression
but of continuous improvement."'
Most important changes within a complex social structure cause stresses and
strains in the political, social, and economic fabric of a society. The relatively rapid
metamorphosis from agrarian to urban living in the United States is no exception.
Associated with this revolution in living habits are new problems in our metropolitan
areas. It is, however, important to remember that not all problems should be solved.
If the sacrifices (costs) of solving a problem are more than the solution is worth,
rational thinking would indicate that no action should be taken to attack the
challenge. Affluence-mongers to the contrary, we need to be reminded that we
do not yet live in the Affluent Society where time and resources are abundant.
It is also important to identify those problems which are indigenous to urban
areas. We are not here primarily interested in the broad problems of culture and
society, but rather those challenges which are uniquely associated with city size,
population density, and the complex of work and living facilities and patterns within
the urban area.2
Professor J. W. Milliman has delineated three key economic variables which
generate substantial costs as well as benefits, and which need to be carefully con-
sidered to insure an efficient urban area. These variables are: (I) land use planning
and land market operation; (2) urban transport systems; and (3) social. overhead
capital facilities (e.g., water, sewage, schools, public utilities, and so on).?
The plan of this paper is to concentrate on variables two and three and take up
in turn the theoretical problems associated with providing social overhead facilities
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in an urban area, and the presentation of some of the empirical evidence on (i) the
suburban-urban exploitation hypothesis, (2) the infra-urban industry problem, and
(3) the patterns in local governmental revenues and expenditures.
I
TH1EORETICAL PROBLEMS
In attempting to isolate the inherent problems of government financing at the
urban level, it is useful to identify the major fiscal functions of a democratic govern-
ment. There are, of course, a large number of distinct although mutually inter-
dependent functions which require particular solutions. Professor Musgrave has
categorized for analytical purposes the multiplicity of public economic functions into
(i) the stabilization of income function, (2) the redistribution function, and (3)
the allocation of resources function.4
The objective of policymakers in the stabilization branch of government is to
pursue and implement programs which will provide us with a continuing high level
of resource utilization (including labor) while avoiding both deflation and inflation.
Of those individuals who believe that income stabilization is a proper function of
government there is widespread agreement that this function should be the responsi-
bility of the central government.5
Professor Brazer has correctly suggested the near impossibility of achieving
stabilization through state and local fiscal policy. Income stabilization policies
pursued by governments which have stringent debt limits, but do not have the
power to change the money supply, impose drastic constraints on a program designed
to mitigate violent fluctuations in income.6 We do not mean to suggest that there
are not ways that local governments can assist the central fisc. There are important
mutual interdependencies between central and local governments with respect to
stabilization policy. The prime responsibility for the income stabilization function,
however, must rest with the central government.
The redistribution function of government in Musgrave's multiple theory of the
budget is fulfilled strictly through the use of taxes and transfer payments at the
central level of governmentC Presumably the "proper" distribution, or more pre-
4 RICHARD MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 5 (1959).
'The policy question of whether to stabilize or not is not an economic question, although the
economist qua economist can point out the economic consequences of such a policy. Ultimately the
stabilization issue has to be decided at the ballot box. Americans apparently have decided in favor
of governmental income stabilization policies, for the Employment Act of 1946 charges the central
government with the responsibility of maintaining high levels of employment, production, and purchasing
power. Moreover, for the first time in our history the x964 presidential candidates of both political
parties renounced the principle of an annually balanced federal budget.
. HpAvaE BRAZER, SOME FISCAL IMPLICATIONS OF METROPOLITANISm 62 (1962).
"For qualifications of this method, see Heller, Economics and the Applied Theory of Public
Expenditures, STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 85T CoNo.,
IsT Sass., FEDERAL EXPENDITURE POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY (PAPERS SUBMITTED BY
PANELISTS APPEAR IN BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL PoLICY) 98-107 (Comm. Print 1957) [hereinafter
cited as FEDERAL EXPENDITURE POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY].
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cisely the magnitude and structure of appropriate target variables, would be provided
to the distribution branch through the political decision-making process.
There are in fact, though, many redistributional aspects of governmental finances
in the urban area. For example, financing educational services involves in varying
combinations the redistribution of income from the rich to the poor, small families
to large families, older generations to younger generations, childless adults to
parents, and from certain religious groups to other religious and nonreligious
groups.' Urban redistribution problems are alleged to be one of the causes behind
the very pluralistic local governmental structure. Residents of rich suburban en-
claves do not want their incomes redistributed. Consequently they resist absorption
attempts on the part of annexation-minded central core cities and other less wealthy
local governments.
Since, however, there are over 90o00 local governments, it seems likely that the
total impact of each governmental unit acting independently on redistributional
policy would lead to total failure in reflecting currently accepted redistributional
standards of the nation's individuals. Despite local governmental aberrations from
a national policy of income redistribution, the main burden of altering the free
market's distribution of income (if income is to be redistributed) must rest with
the central government. In any case, and despite the obvious interdependent rela-
tionships observed in the real world, we are for analytical purposes excluding urban
area governments from conscious roles in performing stabilization and redistribu-
tion functions.
On the assumptions, then, that the central government redistributes income "cor-
rectly" and stabilizes national income at a constant price level, the main economic
objective of local government is its historically accepted goal of providing collective
and quasi-collective goods and services. The allocation of resources function is
paramount for governments in the urban setting.
To analyze the difficulties in financing and allocating resources it is useful to
note briefly the process of exchange in the private market place. In this sector
of the economy trading depends among other things on the fact that individuals
control and own titles or property rights to the goods or services subject to exchange.
If an individual wishes to purchase a good or service, he voluntarily pays the asking
price to obtain the property rights to the commodity. In doing so, he reveals his
true preferences for economic goods. Each individual by voting with his dollars
sends signals to entrepreneurs who translate these signals into varying patterns
of production designed to meet the demands of consumers. A buyer, then, is ex-
cluded from enjoying the services of a good only if he is unwilling or unable to
pay the quoted price for the item. This idea is called the "exclusion principle."9
'Hirsch, Urban Government Services and Their Financing, in WEaNER Z. HiRSCH (ED.), URBAN LIF
AND FoRA 142 (x963).
9 MUSGRAVE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 9.
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Collective goods and services are by their nature different from private goods.
Professor Samuelson has defined a collective or public good as an economic good in
which an individual's consumption of the good does not decrease another person's
consumption of that good.10 Warren Robinson has expressed this idea of the joint
consumption of collective services when he notes that when such a service is supplied
to one consumer it must "inescapably be supplied to all consumers, and, being
supplied to one consumer, can be supplied to other consumers at zero marginal
cost."" This idea of joint consumption, however, is only a necessary and not a
sufficient condition for a collective good or service. The services of a symphony
orchestra, for example, will be consumed jointly, but admission prices are charged
and the service is normally provided in the market. Unlike the private market, no
individual can be excluded from enjoying the services flowing from a public or
collective good. The exclusion principle is inoperative.
What are the implications of defining a collective good as one which involves (i)
joint consumption and (2) an inoperative exclusion principle? First, since the
services will be consumed in equal amounts by all the people and there is no way
to exclude individuals from enjoying the benefits flowing from the good or service,
people will offer little, if anything, in the way of voluntary payments. Each indi-
vidual correctly reasons that the amount of the service he would receive will be
unrelated to his payment. The voluntary market mechanism, will, as a result, fail
to allocate the optimum configuration of resources to the production of a collective
or public good.
If the total cost of the public good under question is relatively small, it is conceiv-
able that the sum of all individual voluntary payments could be in excess of the total
monetary value of the goods actually demanded by consumers. In such a situation
too many resources would be used to produce the collective good at the cost of
giving up too many noncollective goods. The opposite case seems more likely.
For a costly program such as our defense establishment, voluntary contributions
would almost assuredly total much less than the $5o billion or so we spend each
year on defense.
Faced with this dilemma over collective goods, individuals will normally subject
their neighbors and themselves voluntarily to a certain amount of compulsion
through the mechanism of a government. Substituting the governmental budget
process for the market mechanism does not, however, eliminate an inherent difficulty
surrounding collective goods-i.e., prying true preferences from consumers. The
challenge, then, is to devise and select a political decision-making process that will
reflect as nearly as possible the true preferences of individuals.
There is a second serious problem associated with collective goods. In two
slightly different models, both Samuelson and Musgrave have demonstrated that
1 0 Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 36 REv. EcoN. STATis-rics 387 (x954).
11Robinson, Benefits Received Financing in the Federal System, 27 Ni. TAx J. 242 (1964).
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there can be no unique Paretian optimum for an economy with collective goods or
services." This conclusion holds even if consumer preferences for public goods
were revealed and known. The significance of the Samuelson-Musgrave proposition
is that there are an infinite number of Paretian optimums to choose, but we have no
criteria upon which to adjudge the one best position.
There are, then, at least two important problems associated with providing col-
lective goods and services. First, the market mechanism breaks down and fails to
reveal consumer preferences, and therefore cannot yield an efficient allocation of
resources. Substituting a compulsory governmental mechanism for the market does
not solve the problem. Voting processes reveal individual preferences imperfectly
and only in the very vaguest of outlines. Questions concerning the nature, composi-
tion, and magnitude of expenditures and the type and magnitude of taxes are left
largely unresolved. Tax and expenditure decisions on various alternatives are
settled by policymakers' hunches, intuition, and desires along with a mysteriously
obtained reading of the electorate's demands.
As previously noted, a second important problem with collective goods is that,
even if preferences were known, there is no unique Paretian optimum when goods
and services are consumed in equal amounts by individuals. At this stage of
development we have nothing to offer at the national level and little to offer at the
local level of government with respect to a resolution of this Paretian problem.
Both the unrevealed preference problem and the Paretian optimum problem
are to a degree relevant for urban governments. In an admittedly arbitrary
division of governmental services, 0. H. Brownlee has classified the following as
local collective services: welfare, hospitals, police, fire, and general control. General
control includes the activities of the governing (legislative) body, courts, office of
the chief executive, central staff services, and agencies concerned with personnel ad-
ministration, law, recording, and planning and zoning. 3 The critical reader may
wish to exclude hospitals, fire, and police from the classification on the grounds that
fees could be charged for these services. Nevertheless, collective goods and services
at the local level are not insignificant.
Up to this point we have implicitly carried on our analysis as if there were
only two polar positions with respect to classifying economic goods and services-
i.e., public and private. This was the approximately theoretical state of affairs be-
tween the time of those two towering economic works by Adam Smith and Alfred
Marshall.
For analytical purposes Smith employed a methodological device which we shall
call the independence hypothesis 4 He used this device to exclude from his theory
" Samuelson, supra note Io; Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditures,
37 REv. ECoN. STATISTIC 350-56 (1955); MUSGRAVE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 81-84.
"' U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, IV CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS x962, at 612 (x964); Brownlee, User Prices vs.
Taxes, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOmIC RESEARCH, PUBLIC FINANCES: NEEDS, SOURCES AND UTILIZATION
424 (Buchanan ed. I96I) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC FINANCES].
",See MILTON Z. KAFOGLIS, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SUBSIDY PROGRAMS 9 (x961).
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the indirect effect on individuals or firms as a result of economic decisions made by
a different individual or firm. As as result, Smith was able to conclude that each
individual, by pursuing his own best economic interests would be "led by an in-
visible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.""' Thus with
competition and the independence hypothesis, the market mechanism provides for
both the maximization of private and social welfare. In the jargon of the economist,
there will be an efficient allocation of resources in accordance with individuals'
demands if for each of all goods price equals marginal cost, and the total cost of
producing the optimal amount of each good is at a minimum.1"
Marshall drove the first significant wedge into the classical economic conclusion
that the maximization of an individual's private welfare leads to a maximization
of social welfare when he introduced the concept of external economies in pro-
ductionm7  In certain circumstances he noted that a firm's costs of production were
in fact related to the size of the industry. The impact of an action involving an
outlay of costs by one firm in an industry could involve economies for other intra-
industry firms; yet there is no mechanism whereby the benefiting firms could be
charged.
The significance of Marshall's idea is that the independence hypothesis is not uni-
versally applicable and that, where it is inapplicable, equating price with marginal
cost would not give the optimum allocation of resources. The marginal social cost
would be below the marginal private cost and the schism between the two cost
concepts would be translated into too few resources flowing into an industry char-
acterized by external economies.
More recently the concept of externalities' has been extended from the produc-
tion sector to the consumption sector of the economy. There are, it is argued, many
goods and services which provide utility not only to the owner, but, in some degree,
to other individuals as well. Indeed, Baumol asserts that cases of consumption
externalities are the rule rather than the exception."0
In order to provide a general rule for discussion, we shall define positive externali-
ties as uncompensated services rendered by an individual and/or association of
individuals to another individual and/or association of individuals. Negative ex-
ternalities are disservices rendered by an individual and/or association of individuals
to another individual and/or association of individuals who are not compensated
for bearing the disservice.2"
1 ADA SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (Modern Library, 1937).
"
6 See KAFOGLIS, Op. cit. supra note 14, at 6.
'ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 266-90 (i950). See also Viner, Cost Curves and
Supply Curves, in RICHARD V. CLEMENCE (ED.), READINGS IN EcoNOMic ANALYSIS 23-25 (1950).
"
8 Externalities are sometimes referred to as neighborhood or spillover effects.
" W. J. BAuMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE z66 (1952). This was one
of the arguments presented by Veblen in his The Theory of the Leisure Class, but the significance of the
point was ignored for some time by some of the more "rigorous" economists.
"See Scitovsky, Two Types of External Economies, 62 J. POLIT. ECONOMY 143-5r (1954); KAFOOLIS,
op. cit. supra note 14, at 12.
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These definitions permit us to array the collection of all economic goods, services,
and disservices on a spectrum. Toward the extreme left-hand portion of the
spectrum we could place such disservices as fraud, blackmail, and stealing. In many
societies these predatory acts are judged to have extreme negative externalities and
are completely outlawed by governments. Further to the right on the spectrum, we
might find the disservices of smog and other industrial wastes. Close to but still
to the left of center would be a neighbor's unkempt yard. The center of the spectrum
would include all those goods and services which meet the prerequisites of the
independence hypothesis. Moving from the center out to the right of the spectrum
we might find a friend's happy disposition, a neighbor's beautiful flower garden, the
existence of outstanding health and hospital services in the community, and educa-
tion.
We could not expect to find unanimous agreement on which side of the spectrum
a service should be placed, or how far out on either side the service should be.
The burglar will have different placements and rankings than the law-abiding
citizen. An extremely competitive individual who plays the crab grass game might
get pleasure out of his neighbor's unkempt lawn. The individuals of any society,
however, develop a rough consensus about the placement of most services on the
spectrum.
From general observation it appears that a great deal of economic activity involves
either positive or negative externalities. Disservices or services of much of this
activity, however, could be placed close to the center of the spectrum. Here the
degree of misallocation of resources is so small and the cost of adjustment so large
that we ignore externalities. As we move further out to the right or left, some
individual or voluntary associational arrangements for compensation could be used,
although in America our mores seem to dictate against individual arrangements.
Faced with a noisy neighborhood party, for example, the average disturbed Ameri-
can acts as if his only alternative is either to call the police or grin and bear it.
There may well be, however, a price that the raucous group would be willing to pay
in order to buy the disturbed individual's acquiescence, or vice-versa, depending on
the status of the legal property rights in noise.'
There is a large gray area on each side of our spectrum where there are varying
opinions concerning the magnitude and importance of externalities.22  Because of
ignorance or lack of institutional arrangements, or the high cost of privately resolving
conflict, some citizens will turn to government for solutions. Indeed, the great
debate between visceral liberals and gut conservatives over the proper level and
" For an excellent analysis of various alternative solutions to such problems as this one, see Coase,
The Problem o1 Social Costs, 3 J. LAW AND ECONOmICS i (1960).
" One of the great challenges to the student of government finance is to quantify externalities in the
gray area. For a somewhat optimistic view of the current attack on this problem, see Ackoff, Toward
Quantitative Evaluation of Urban Services, in HowARm G. SCHALLER (ED.), PUBLIC ExPENDITURE
DECISIONS IN THE URBAN COM UNITY 91-117 (1963).
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composition of governmental spending centers on the gray areas of our spectrum.
Unfortunately, there is a paucity of solid empirical evidence on externalities, costs,
and benefits concerning health, air and water pollution, urban renewal, recreational
facilities, education, and other topics belabored in the great debate.
We shall call these gray area services quasi-collective or quasi-public goods or
services. If the optimal allocation of resources and neutrality in the distribution of
income is to be achieved by metropolitan area governments, these quasi-public goods
and services must be paid for by those who receive the benefits. 3 Getting bene-
ficiaries to pay for quasi-collective goods is an extremely complicated problem which
the local government decision-maker must face even if his jurisdiction is largely
isolated from other local governmental units.
A set of fees charged to the direct beneficiary will not per se get at the indirect
beneficiaries. Given that indirect beneficiaries' preferences are unknown to govern-
mental officials, no tax or price would be successful in capturing the proper mix of
purchasing power from the various individuals in the community.
Another factor that can complicate achieving an efficient allocation of resources
in metropolitan area governments is our political and fiscal system of constitutional
federalism. Under this arrangement, intergovernmental relations run the traditional
gamut of national-state and state-local relationships in addition to the increasing
importance of the emerging national-local level arrangement. There are not only
various combinations of vertical relations between different levels of government, but
also horizontal relations between and among peer governments within a given level
of government.
Horizontal relations between local governments involve opportunities for both
cooperation and conflict. Associations such as leagues of cities and municipalities
not only act as lobbies on and against the power of other levels of government, but can
also serve as a focal point for the resolution of intercity and intraurban conflict.
Their uniform model tax ordinances, for example, frequently lower the cost of
compliance to multiple-city multiple-outlet busindsses. These voluntary associations,
however, have not been successful in resolving some of the basic conflicts between
and among local jurisdictions.
In an urban area where there may be over iooo separate local goverments, 24 the
analyst is concerned not only with the relationship among individuals and a local
government, but also with the relationships among individuals and a whole host of
governments. In a pluralistic local governmental setting, a jurisdiction will provide
public and quasi-public benefits to its own residents, but quite often these benefits will
spill over onto the residents of juxtaposed neighboring jurisdictions which escape the
cost of providing the services. Moreover, nonresidents may also be the source of
negative externalities to a local neighboring city.
22 BRAzEIR, op. cit. supra note 6, at 64.
"
4 U.S. BuREAU oF CENSUS, I CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS 1962, at 12 (1964).
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In the balkanized urban area the problem of allocating scarce resources efficiently
is even more difficult than the extremely complex challenge that faces the local
governmental decision-maker in an isolated community. There are interjuris-
dictional as well as intrajurisdictional positive and negative externalities when there
are multiple contiguous local governmental units. Yet in order to achieve an
efficient allocation of resources among competing ends, marginal costs must be
equated with marginal benefits for each individual.
Making operational the principle of equating costs and benefits at the margin
can be frustrated in an urban environment because of legal restrictions on voting
rights between and among jurisdictions. These restrictions exclude nonresidents
from the decision-making process in relevant neighboring communities. More-
over, there is the issue of establishing the legality of various property rights. Do,
for example, the owners of a factory located on the edge of Community A, which
is adjacent to Community B, have a legal property right to the unlimited use of
the air? If they do, then the smoke that belches forth from the stacks of the factory
is a consequence which the residents of Community B have to live with or bargain
over. The cost of bargaining and buying clean air rests largely on the residents of
B. If these costs are higher than the costs associated with obtaining relief from the
state legislature (or even the United States Congress, in some cases), then the local
problem is escalated to a more central level of government. If even the costs associ-
ated with getting a more central level of government to solve the problem are greater
than the value of clean air to the residents of Community B, then the status quo will
prevail.
If, on the other hand, the owners of the factory do not have property rights to
the use of air, they must bear the cost of bargaining and rearranging their pro-
duction function. Sewage and water problems are other examples which involve
the establishment of legal property rights. When legal property rights are in the
process of change or are not clear, however, arrangements for resolving conflict and
pushing costs and benefits to equality are inhibited.
There is also the question of prying true preferences for governmental services
from nonresidents in attempting to meet the cost-benefit criterion in a multi-
governmental environment. Even if true preferences were known, there is the addi-
tional problem of effectively exacting and collecting correct payments from both
direct and indirect nonresident beneficiaries.
We should emphasize that the mere existence of externalities does not neces-
sarily imply that action should be taken to collect money from nonpaying bene-
ficiaries. Such action would be economically justifiable only if the cost of obtaining
the funds were less than the amount of money appropriated from nonpaying
beneficiaries. It is often economically rational to settle for a state of least im-
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perfection. Because of both the nature of collective and quasi-collective goods
and services and our present state of knowledge, local governments, whether isolated
or part of an urban area, will have to settle for second order efficiency.25
II
A PARTIAL CONCEPTUAL SOLUTION TO THE URBAN FINANCING PROBLEM
One can view the typical politically fragmented metropolitan area as a competitive
arena where many jurisdictions compete for residents and/or where voters adopt
that government which best satisfies their preference patterns. The competition,
however, is more closely akin to the economist's more recent formulation of monopo-
listic competition rather than the classical model of competition. Product differentia-
tion, which is a necessary although not sufficient condition for monopolistic competi-
tion, is apparently becoming an important characteristic of local governmental
collective and quasi-collective goods and services.26
Current and prospective urban dwellers can choose alternative mixes of collective
and quasi-collective services from an array of local governmental units. Some
individuals may opt to live in the high population density core city which is con-
venient to cultural attractions, variety shopping, and place of work as well as slums,
gang wars, noise, and traffic congestion. Other people may choose to live on small
plots of lawn in the large suburbs with new schools and new streets, but sporadic
police protection and little, if any, public recreational facilities. Alternatively, some
richly endowed suburbs offer large wooded lots and excellent police and fire pro-
tection as well as septic tanks and open ditches in place of sewage and storm drains.
The sparsely populated industrial enclave frequently offers a variety of public services
at relatively low cost to its individual residents.
If it is true that we are approaching the Age of Local Public Services, we may
expect a greater variety of governmental services, even though public administrators
at the local level appear to be less imaginative than their private counterparts?7
Moreover, to illustrate the variety of choice in large urban areas, we should note not
only the varied choices of governmental services within the metropolitian area, but
also the varying quality of services.
In a most provocative paper Professor Tiebout has provided us with a highly
imaginative analysis of local finance in an urban environment. He sees the consumer-
voter-taxpayer choosing from a myriad of alternative governments that jurisdiction
which best fits his set of preferences for public services. The greater the variety
and number of local governments, the closer an individual can realize his preference
" See Buchanan, Federal Expenditure and State Functions, in FEDERAL EXPENDITURE POLICY FOR
ECONOMIC GRowTH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 174-79.2 6 For a discussion of the point, see NVILBUR R. THompsoN, A PREFACE TO URBAN ECONOMICS 2X3
(,963).
"'See id. at 216.
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pattern.28 "Moving or failing to move replaces the usual market test of willingness
to buy a good and reveals the consumer-voter's demand for public goods. '29
The allocation of resources to public goods will then approximate the situations
which would exist if public goods had all the characteristics of private goods. There
is in Tiebout's model less adapting to the preferences of individuals by local govern-
ments than there is local jurisdictions being "adopted by""0 economizing and utility-
maximizing consumer-voter-taxpayers.
The significance of Tiebout's contribution is that there is at least something close
to a conceptual solution to the public goods problem of joint consumption and non-
exclusion at the local level. It is useful, however, to delineate the assumptions (hy-
potheses) he explicitly used in deriving his interesting proposition in order to under-
stand the heavy artillery that has been employed to attack the Tiebout thesis. They
are
(I) individual mobility between and among jurisdictions;
(2) knowledge of differences between and among alternative governmental
revenue and expenditure patterns;
(3) a relatively wide choice of governmental units;
(4) no restrictions on employment opportunities;
(5) no externalities associated with local public services;
(6) some factor limiting the optimum size of a community; and
(7) communities seeking to reach that optimum size.81
We have precious little empirical information about these hypotheses. Certainly
there is not in the real world perfect mobility and knowledge, although Tiebout
does cite some evidence on a "surprising awareness of differing revenue and ex-
penditure patterns" by consumer-voter-taxpayers. 2  One could argue on a priori
grounds that the existence of zoning laws as well as racial and religious discrimina-
tion decreases mobility. Individuals also live, work, shop, and play across juris-
dictional boundaries with the result that externalities (to the individual) do exist.
But the fact is, we have little quantitative knowledge concerning the magnitude of
external benefits and costs.
As is the case with any complex theory, Tiebout's model does not represent a
"true" map of the real world in the balkanized urban area. Until there is more
empirical information about human behavior in the urban area, we must, on the
one hand, refrain from thinking of the Tiebout theory as a mere rationalization of
the status quo in the politically fragmented urban area. On the other hand, we
should not uncritically accept the theory as a useful predictive device. We are, how-
'
8 Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POLIT. EcoNoMY 416 (1956).
"I1d. at 420.
10 Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 57 J. PoLrr. ECONOMY 211-21 (1950).
a Tiebout, supra note 28, at 419-20.
I d. at 423.
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ever, in Tiebout's debt for having ground out a set of operational hypotheses against
which information can be brought to bear.
III
THE SUBURBAN-URBAN EXPLOITATION HYPOTHESIS
What are the magnitudes of intrametropolitan governmental externalities? This
question is sometimes phrased to delineate the schism between the central city and
the suburbs. We are learning, however, that suburbs can manifest markedly
different spatial, density, population age, commercial, industrial, and other char.
acteristics. They cannot be lumped together and labeled bedroom cities. Because
of the paucity of relevant data, easy generalizations concerning the suburban-core
city exploitation hypothesis are difficult if not impossible.
In a pioneering work Amos Hawley discovered that per capita public expendi-
tures of central cities rise as the percentage of the total population in the metro-
politan area residing in the core city decreases0 3 Brazer's intensive study of forty
large cities confirms Hawley's discovery3 4 This factor implies higher and higher
central city per capita spending as suburban population grows at a rate faster than
that of the core city. Margolis has found that "the ratio of per capita central city
public payrolls to those of the total SMSA increases as the percentage of the total
urban population which resides in the central city decreases." 5 He also discovered
that the ratio of total employment to residents in the central city increases as its
share of the metropolitan area population decreases. 36 None of this information, how-
ever, denies the hypothesis that there is no exploitation of the central city by suburban
residents. All of the findings may be true, but the suburbanite may be contributing
the approximate amount (or even more) required by the central city to finance this
daytime resident of the core city. The suburbanite's economic activities within the
central city presumably are reflected in higher property values, higher sales, and
higher incomes.
Brazer has stated that even if the suburban resident does pay for the central
city services he receives, he does not bear any of the high governmental costs
associated with the increasing concentration of lower-income families within the core
city. He argues further that "to the extent that suburban communities, through
zoning regulations and discriminatory practices in rentals and real estate transactions
contribute directly to the concentration in the central city of socioeconomic groups
which impose heavy demands upon local governmental services, they are, in fact,
exploiting the central city."'3 7 In the remaining part of this section of the paper, we
23 Hawley, Metropolitan Population and Municipal Government Expenditures in Central Cities, 7 J.
SOCIAL ISSUES 100-08 (195).
HArvEY E. BRAZER, CITY ExPENDiTuREs IN THE UNITED STATES 54-59 (1959).
Margolis, Metropolitan Finance Problems, in PUBLIC FINANcES, op. cit. supra note 13, at 299, 258.
30 ibid.
IT BRAZER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 77.
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shall sketch some guidelines which will help lead us to an evaluation of Brazer's
position on the exploitation thesis.
Buchanan has demonstrated that it is normally advantageous for a taxpayer
to locate in a wealthier rather than poorer jurisdiction? If a local government does
redistribute income, wealthy individuals in a rich city will normally be subjected
to a lower rate of taxation than their equally rich counterparts living in a poor
municipality. As a result the widely accepted criterion of horizontal equity in
taxation is violated. Moreover, when noncentral governments attempt redistribu-
tion policies, the movement of resources caused by these fiscal differentials may
actually cause our national income to decline?9 An individual in a poor community
with a factor income of $io,ooo and a tax bill of $iooo for redistributional purposes
would find it advantageous to take a position in a rich jurisdiction where he earns
only $9,5o0, but pays a tax of only $400 for redistributional purposes. Such "un-
economic" shifts in the allocation of resources are more apt to occur as a result of
fiscal differentials between states, but shifts between local governments within a
state can also take place.
Even if local governments use a quid pro quo basis (marginal social costs equal
marginal social benefit) to determine the pattern of public resource use, it would still be
advantageous for an individual to locate in a community with higher average incomes
rather than lower average incomes. This proposition stems mainly from the joint
consumption characteristics of pure collective goods and services and is illustrated
in the accompanying diagrams. In order to concentrate on the income aspects of
the problem, we shall assume no interjurisdictional externalities and no differences
in tastes between the individuals in the rich and poor communities.
Figure one depicts a poor community populated by Mr. A and Mr. B. The
lines AA and BB are their respective demands for collective goods and services.
The line SS represents a constant cost supply curve for producing collective goods,
and DD is the poor community's aggregate demand for collective goods. It is de-
rived by adding Mr. A's and Mr. B's individual demands vertically, not horizontally
as is done for private market aggregate demand. The intersection of DD and SS
yields the equilibrium quantity of collective goods-i.e., OQ. Mr. A will pay price
Pa, and Mr. B a price of Pb in order to obtain OQ output of collective services.
Unlike the private market, individuals obtain the same output which is collectively
shared, but pay different prices.
Figure two is constructed in a way similar to figure one. The reason Mr. X and
Mr. Y obtain more collective goods and services than A and B is that they have higher
incomes. The dotted line ArA, in figure two helps to demonstrate why individuals
might move to a richer community. If Mr. A should emigrate from the poor to
the rich locality, BB is now the only relevant aggregate demand for governmental
"Buchanan, Comment, in PUBLIC FINANCES, op. cit. supra note 13, at 122-29.
" Id. at 129.
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goods and services in the poor city. Accordingly, Mr. B will pay price OPbi, and
obtain OQ1, quantity of public services. As Mr. A enters the rich community his
demand does not alter the aggregate demand for collective goods and services
through the relevant range. Because of his relatively low income, his demand or
ArAr is such that he pays no price or fee for governmental goods even though he
enjoys OQr output of public services along with Mr. X and Mr. Y who also enjoy
OQr output.
Because of fiscal advantages of this type, part or all of the expected extra value
inherent in the public sector of the rich community may be capitalized in the price
of the land. In an unrestricted free market for property, the original owners stand
to make capital gains.
All governmentally provided goods and services in a rich community, however,
are not pure collective goods. Some of them are quasi-collective goods and may
be financed by some combination of taxes and fees. As new families move into this
type of community, relatively less public swimming pool space, swings, and so on,
are available to the original rich residents than before the immigration of low per
capita income residents. The early settlers of a wealthy community, then, may be
willing to exclude low-income families from their neighborhoods by means of
various restrictive devices.4 In effect, the rich are willing to trade their capital gains
in order to preserve their fiscal advantages.
The economic reasoning outlined here is only a partial explanation of the existence
of restrictive devices. There are, of course, many other reasons both obvious and
subtle.
"For an interesting analysis of how the concentrated poor can successfully push the rich out of
their old neighborhoods in the absence of restrictions, see Margolis, Metropolitan Finance Problen, in
PUBLIC FINANCES, op. cit. supra note 13, at 236-37.
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Existing suburban restrictions do reduce the mobility of certain central city
residents. Any change from the status quo-i.e., from existing restrictions, involves
gains and losses to different sets of individuals, but the economist qua economist
cannot at this stage of development determine whether total welfare in the metro-
politan area would increase or decrease if the barriers were removed. Brazer's indict-
ment of suburban restrictions is a position with which many individuals could easily
sympathize, but it is a value judgment.
IV
INFRAMETROPOLITAN PROBLEMS WITH INDUSTRY
Part of the folklore of urban finance is wrapped in the largely uncritical acceptance
of the hypothesis that the attraction of new industry is fiscally advantageous for a
local community. In order to keep taxes relatively low, local governmental decision-
makers vie for commercial and industrial enterprises. In some cases urban govern-
ments even grant "tax holidays" for new industrial properties, although this practice
is not common among large cities.#'
Mabel Walker has pointed out that much has been written about the effect of
varying tax patterns on the location of industry, but very little has been done with
the analysis of the impact of the location of industry on tax revenues and tax rates.42
The conclusions of the few studies which attack this problem do not agree with
respect to the net gains to be realized from attracting industrial activity.
Louis Loewenstein has catalogued various empirical cost-revenue studies on in-
dustrial location 3 The Frederick P. Clark and Associates reports purport to show
that industry provides the local government a ratio of revenue to costs of about three
to one in Greenwich, Connecticut,4" and four to one in Yorktown, New York 5
Homer Hoyt Associates derive a revenue cost ratio of three to one in Evanston,
Illinois,4" and five to one in Arlington, Virginia#' Two other studies of the Phila-
delphia and Boston areas also infer that industry produces a ratio of revenue to costs
in excess of one 8 These results imply that industry pays somewhere between three
to five times in taxes more than what they cost the local jurisdictions which provide
the various governmental goods and services required by industry.
Empirical cost-revenue studies have not been without their critics. Barnes and
Raymond note the importance of the assumptions underlying cost allocation as well
"1 Feinberg, The Implications of Core City Decline for the Fiscal Structure of the Core-City, X7 NAT.
TAx. J. 216 (1964).
"MABEL NVALKER, BUSINESS ENTERPRISE AND THE CITY 37 (957)-
4" Loewenstein, The Impact of New Industry on the Fiscal Revenues and Expenditures of Suburban
Communities, x6 NAT. TAX J. 113 (x963).
" FREDERICK P. CLARK AND ASSOCIATES, EcoNoRmIc STUDY (1954).
"FREDERIcK P. CLARX AND ASSOCIATES, LAND USE AND COMMUNITY TAXES (1958).
"' HOMER HoYr ASSOCIATES, ECoNOMIC SURVEY OF THE LAND USES FOR EVANSTON, ILLINOIS (1948).
'"'HOMER HoYT ASSOCIATES, EcONOomIc SURVEY OF THE LAND USES OF ARLINGTON COUNTY, VIRGINIA
(1951).
48 Loewenstein, supra note 43, at u15-16.
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as the statistical limitations of most cost-revenue statistics 9 Coughlin and Isard have
warned of the importance of investigating secondary cost factors arising as an indirect
result of the attraction of new industry." Among other weaknesses of urban area
cost-revenue analyses, Wheaton has noted the neglect of future industrial expansion
costs to the governing jurisdiction, and the arbitrary weighting of charges or costs
to residential areas.5 Margolis has also stressed the point that "accompanying the
business use of land there will be a change in the nature of residential uses and an
expansion of public services so that tax costs per dollar of property value will in-
crease."
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The more recent studies on the desirability or undesirability of attracting local
industry appear to be more promising since they meet some of the previously
mentioned criticisms. As a result of his excellent case studies, Louis Loewenstein
concludes that suburban municipalities can improve their financial position by at-
tracting new industries and encouraging the growth of existing firms which not only
have a relatively high value of assessment per employee, but also have employees who
are not likely to relocate as a result of industrial relocation or growth. "Establish-
ments which are semi-automated in nature such as petroleum refineries or radio and
transmitting towers" would probably be assets to a municipal fiscal structure.
Loewenstein suggests that those types of industries which hire many secondary
workers, unskilled, and older female help, such as the garment and needle trades
would also appear to be beneficial to a municipality because of the low probability
of these workers moving their homesites to their places of work.
In a recent analysis published at the same time as the Loewenstein study, Pro-
fessors Groves and Riew derive propositions similar to Loewenstein's. In attempting
to assess whether industrialization provides a net fiscal gain or loss to a community,
Groves and Riew emphasize evaulating the following factors: (i) the capital-labor
ratio, (2) the nature of the labor force, (3) the dispersion of the labor force in the
urban area, (4) the dependent to employee ratio, and (5) the amount of governmental
services directly required by industry. The higher the capital to labor ratio, the higher
the skills and wages of the labor force, the lower the dependent to employee ratio
and the more laborers with low valued homes and other capital who live outside the
jurisdiction, the greater the fiscal advantage (or the less the disadvantage) to the
industrializing jurisdiction.5"
Brazer's study of the city of Detroit supports the hypothesis that a city's acquisition
'" Barnes & Raymond, The Fiscal Approach to Land Use Planning, 21 J. AM. INST. OF PLANNERS, 2-3,
71-75 (1955).
" ROBERT E. COUGHLIN & WALTER ISARD, MUNICIPAL COSTS AND REVENUES RESULTING FRO,, COAI-
MUNITY GROWTH 44 (I957), referred to in Loewenstein, supra note 43, at a15 .
"Wheaton, Application of Cost-Revenue Studies to Fringe Areas, 30 J. Am. INT. OF PLANNERS 70-73
('959).
"Margolis, Municipal Fiscal Structure in a Metropolitan Region, 65 J. POLIT. EcONOMIY 236 (1957).
"
3Loewenstein, supra note 43, at 134.
" Groves & Riew, The Impact of Industry on Local Taxes-A Simple Model, 16 NAT. TAX J. 138-42
(1963).
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of new commercial and industrial property tends to reduce effective tax rates. He
cautions against broad generalizations, however, and suggests a study of the factors
mentioned by Groves, Riew, and Loewenstein before judging whether industrializa-
tion is fiscally advantageous in specific cases.5
In a thorough theoretical and empirical study of the fiscal impact of industrializa-
tion on local schools, Werner Hirsch isolated several revenue and cost variables in an
attempt to assess the fiscal effects of industrialization." The revenue factors include
changes in (I) industrial and commercial property values, (2) employment, (3)
number of families, (4) residential property values, and (5) public school enroll-
ment which is the basis for state financial aid to schools. Cost factors also include
changes in employment and public school enrollment, for these variables affect both
school operating and capital costs. Hirsch discovered after accounting for both direct
and indirect revenue factors (except the indirect revenue from state aid) and
pertinent cost factors that in thirteen of the sixteen industries he analyzed, in-
dustrialization led to net losses in fiscal resources to the jurisdiction. Net gains re-
sulted only from the petroleum-coal, chemicals, and motor vehicles industries. The
industry which caused the greatest net loss was textile and apparel manufacturing.5 7
When Hirsch made adjustments for state aid to schools, ten of the sixteen in-
dustries proved to be fiscally advantageous to the school district. Textiles and
apparel manufacturing, however, still caused the greatest deterioration in the fiscal
status of the tax jurisdiction. Hirsch concluded that his study "confirms the claim
that industrialization, on the average, improves the fiscal health of a school district,
but only if state aid is included as a revenue source. 5 8
It appears that on the basis of the rather limited but more sophisticated recent
analyses that industrialization is not an unmixed blessing to local governments. As
discussed by Hirsch and others, relatively low paying industries have many employees
with school age children. Thus, while they contribute to increasing costs, such in-
dustries and individuals have relatively low assessed valuation of plants and homes.
The opposite case, however, apparently holds for highly capital intensive industries.
The indiscriminate wooing of industry would seem to be a highly unpromising
method to achieve fiscal advantage for local governments.
V
URBAN EXPENDITURES
There have been at least two major changes in American living patterns during
the past half century. First, we changed from a primarily farm to an urban society.
By 192o just over half our population lived in cities, and an additional nineteen
r BaAZER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 70-71.
" Hirsch, Fiscal Impact of Industrialization on Local Schools, 46 REV. EcoN. AND STATisTics 193
(x964).
57Id. at 195-98.
" ibid.
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per cent of the people were classified as rural nonfarm. In I96O, only one out of every
fourteen Americans were farm dwellers. 0  The second major change in living
patterns is the largely postwar switch to the suburb which together with the old
central city has spawned the metropolitan area. Today almost seventy per cent of
the population lives in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs), 0 and over
half of these individuals live in suburbs.6 The number of people living in the 212
SMSAs increased by over twenty-six per cent from i95o to i96o, while the rest
of the population grew by only seven per cent.0 2 Over eighty per cent of the popula-
tion growth in the SMSAs during the i95o decade occurred in the suburbs."3 It
has been estimated that by 1975 over sixty per cent of the SMSA population will live
in suburbs.4
There have been major economic changes associated with the dramatic shifts
in the American population. By i96o over seventy-five per cent of all bank deposits
in the United States were located in SMSAs. These areas also accounted for approx-
imately seventy-five per cent of all manufacturing payrolls, value added by manu-
facture, and number of employees.65 Since i95o the largest percentage gains in
employment have been in the primarily metropolitan-linked activities of medical
care, engineering and business services, public education, and other governmental
services. °6
As might be expected from examining demographic changes, there has been a
persistent growth in the number of dwelling units since World War II. At the
beginning of the i95o decade the nation had 46 million dwellings. By 196o this
figure had increased to over 58 million or by approximately twenty-seven per cent.
These statistics represent net increases, for over 4.5 million units were either torn
down or abandoned during the decade. The cost of new dwellings is now at the
rate of over $25 billion annually or about 4-5 per cent of our Gross National
Product.67
Most of the dwellings built in the United States since World War II have been
single-family houses. The major part of the new housing built during the 1950
decade was constructed in the SMSAs. While over three million units were built
in the central cities, almost six million units were constructed outside the central
" ARNOLD B. BARAca, U.S.A. AND ITs ECONOMIC FuTuRE is (r964).
"
0An SMSA consists of a county or two or more contiguous counties each with one city or two
contiguous cities with a population of 5o,oo or more. A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area can be
used as rough proxy variable for a metropolitan area. For a more rigorous definition of an SMSA, see
ROBERT G. SMrrs, PUBLIC AuTHORITIEs, SPECIAL DISTRICTS, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 155-57 (x964).
" BARACiI, op. cit. supra note 59, at 96.
"' Milliman, supra note 2, at 8.
"For an excellent analysis of the relationship between rates of growth in population and state-local
expenditures, see Spangler, The Eflect of Population Growth Upon State and Local Government Expendi-
tures, z6 NAT. TX J. 193-96 (1963).
" COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, GUIDING METROPOLITAN GRoWTH 16 (1960).
" HIRsCH, op. At. supra note 8, at 532.
c COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, Op. cit. supra note 64, at 17.
o BARAcir, op. cit. supra note 59, at 39-40.
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cities but within the SMSAs. These factors are reflected in our spreading suburban
sprawl. In the decade of the 196os, however, construction of apartment houses has
boomed. While in 1955 only one out of ten new dwellings was an apartment, in
1962 one out of three new dwellings was an apartment unit.68 This factor would
imply further increases in the population density.
Central cities are subject to the pressures of serving a daytime population thirty
to fifty per cent larger than the core city residential population. This growth of con-
gestion with all its consequent problems seems only to be encouraged by providing
more and more expensive expressways and parking spaces. 9
Central cities also continue to serve the historic function as the immigration
and settling center for low-income migrants who must adapt to their strange new
environment. Urban blight which afflicts commerical and industrial areas as well
as residential neighborhoods continues to plague the core city. There is also evi-
dence to indicate that blight is a fact in some suburbs. It is interesting to note, how-
ever, that in i95o the Census Bureau estimated that approximately ten per cent of
our houses were "dilapidated," while in 196o this figure had decreased to five per
cent.70
In the relatively newer suburbs the demand for new schools, water and sewage
systems, fire protection, streets, and utility lines has increased dramatically since the
end of World War II. The vast majority of new houses being constructed are built
in suburbs, and it has been estimated that each new home in a suburban develop-
ment is associated with a public capital outlay of between $2,500 and $3,500, depend-
ing on the particular characteristics of the development. Governmental per capita
capital outlays are substantially higher in suburbs than either in the core city or
rural area.7 '
Metropolitan area-wide problems have also increased as a result of demographic
and economic changes. The mass use of motor transportation has contributed to
mass congestion. The traditional transportation network of public transportation,
rail commuter service, and motor transportation has been thrown out of balance.
This imbalance is due partly to the fact that the ownership of these both competing
and complementary transport facilities rests in a maze of public agencies and private
companies.7 2 The federal government has also aggravated the problem by pouring
billions of dollars into the largely exclusive support of automobile and truck
transportation, although the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
has recommended that the central government support metropolitan mass trans-
portation facilities and services.73 Other serious metropolitan area-wide problems
0 8 Ibid.
0' COMMIrT E FOR EcoNomic DEvELoPmENT, op. cit. supra note 64, at 19.
'1 BAnAC, op. cit. supra note 59, at 41-42.
71 CommTrrEE FOR EcoNoMIIC DEVELOPMENT, op. cit. supra note 64, at 21.
' Vernon, The Economics and Finances of the Large Metropolis, go DAEDALus 42 (ig6i).
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR MASS TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES AND SERVICES IN METROPOLITAN AREAS 12-13 (g6i).
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TABLE I
PER CENT OF A STATE'S LOcAL FINANCES IN ITS SMSAs, 1962
Revenue Revenue Revenue Per Cent Per Cent
STATE Total from from from own of of
Revenue State U.S. Gov't Sources Expenditures Debt
Maine ............... 19.5% 11.3% 2.3% 21.9% 20.0, 29.6%
N.H ................. 15.8 8.1 20.8 16.1 16.8 19.7
Vt ................... No
SMSAs
Mass ................. 84.3 85.8 80.5 84.9 94.0 87.6
R.I .................. 86.6 85.8 64.1 88.0 87.0 88.5
Com ................ 79.6 73.2 85.5 80.7 79.6 80.0
N.Y ................. 89.0 80.8 92.8 91.8 89.2 94.3
N.J ................. 79.2 75.5 82.0 79.7 79.0 79.1
Pa .................. 81.0 67.9 92.8 85.3 81.0 86.9
Ohio ................. 73.0 63.0 94.3 75.7 73.4 78.7
Ind .................. 48.3 39.8 60.8 50.8 49.1 56.1
III ................... 82.5 78.8 92.5 83.0 83.3 87.1
Mich ................. 77.2 68.4 86.1 80.4 77.6 82.4
Wis .................. 50.5 40.1 67.5 56.1 50.3 62.2
Minn ................. 52.1 45.5 73.0 54.5 53.4 63.5
Iowa ................ 31.9 24.4 67.6 33.1 32.9 41.1
Mo .................. 64.8 47.9 76.0 68.7 65.9 77.8
N.D .................. 12.1 8.5 12.0 13.4 11.2 18.5
S.D .................. 11.8 11.5 3.7 12.5 11.5 14.1
Neb .................. 38.8 30.1 76.3 39.8 40.4 38.1
Kans ................. 36.5 31.3 56.3 38.1 36.7 54.1
Del .................. 68.6 63.4 58.6 73.6 64.1 78.0
Md .................. 83.4 78.9 86.7 85.7 84.5 87.8
Va ................... 62.7 48.4 88.1 67.0 66.2 80.1
W. Va ................ 37.0 23.6 39.5 43.8 39.3 51.4
N.C .................. 33.1 24.2 44.2 38.7 34.9 47.9
S.C .................. 33.7 29.8 55.7 35.2 33.2 39.2
Ga ................... 51.8 33.1 62.1 58.5 53.4 66.9
Fla .................. 67.2 52.5 62.0 71.1 66.3 67.7
Ky .................. 43.9 21.1 78.7 52.0 43.0 50.0
Tenn ................. 61.3 38.0 69.6 66.8 60.9 63.3
Ala .................. 47.2 33.9 61.0 52.2 47.7 59.5
Miss ................. 11.6 6.3 9.4 14.8 12.5 18.7
Ark .................. 23.9 14.2 60.8 27.3 24.2 33.0
La ................... 51.8 42.4 78.3 58.6 52.4 58.9
Okla ................. 44.2 30.6 65.5 48.8 49.3 70.1
Texas ................ 66.4 57.6 75.3 68.9 67.6 74.4
Mont ................ 24.7 21.3 31.3 25.6 25.4 32.2
Idaho ................ No
SMSAs
Wyo ................. No
SMSAs
Colo ................. 64.3 52.8 92.3 69.0 64.2 75.3
N.M ................. 26.0 22.3 29.1 28.9 28.6 39.5
Ariz ................. 76.1 70.0 45.0 79.6 77.1 80.2
Utah ................ 65.0 60.6 43.9 67.6 63.8 75.9
Nev .................. 72.8 65.7 82.5 75.0 75.5 87.0
Alaska ............... No
SMSAs
Hawaii ............. 73.7 49.8 100.0 80.0 74.0 90.1
Wash ................. 64.1 58.2 56.7 66.8 61.5 38.2
Oregon .............. 51.8 46.2 30.7 56.0 53.5 54.9
Calif ................. 87.2 84.1 84.6 88.4 86.5 87.5
Source: U.S. BuifAu OF m CENSUS, VOL. IV, CENSuS or Gowvmmirurs 1962, at 140-87 (1064).
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include the pollution of our air and water, policies with respect to fringe-area vacant
land which is being absorbed into the metropolitan area at the rate of approximately
one million acres a year, and questions relating to the pattern of industrial develop-
ment.
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The challenges and problems briefly outlined above have been responsible for
significant increases in local governmental spending. Direct local government ex-
penditures increased from $9.1 billion to $42.3 billion or by 365 per cent between
1946 and i963." The ratio of local expenditures to net national product increased
from 4-7 per cent in 1948 to 7.1 per cent in 1962. These relationships imply that the
income elasticity of local public spending is considerably greater than unity.
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Table one shows what per cent of total revenues of local governments in a state
was received by governments located in the SMSAs during 1962. Similar percentages
for the SMSAs are also derived for the following categories: (i) revenue distributed
to local government by the state government; (2) revenue distributed to local gov-
ernment by the federal government, (3) revenue derived from own sources, (4) the
percentage of total local spending done by governments in SMSAs, and (5) the per-
centage of total local debt incurred by governments in SMSAs.
As expected, those states with large metropolitan populations have the greatest
proportion of local governmental spending in their SMSAs. In twenty-eight states
over half of all local governmental expenditures are made in metropolitan areas.
7
Including Alaska, Idaho, Vermont, and Wyoming, which have no SMSAs, over
seventy per cent of all local governmental spending is done by jurisdictions within
metropolitan areas. These data suggest the financial importance of urbanized areas.
Table two shows the composition of local governmental expenditures of urban
areas for various functions in 196o and the average percentage annual increase in per
capita amounts by function between 1952 and i96o. Basic local governmental
expenditures averaged approximately $212 per person. The expenditures for public
schools, which averaged about $88 per capita, was the largest single item, representing
41.5 per cent of total urban expenditures and over 343 per cent more on a per capita
basis than the category of streets and roads, which was the second most important
function.
Per capita local governmental expenditures of urban areas for all functions
averaged an annual increase of about 6.7 per cent between 1952 and i96o. This
average figure of 6.7 per cent was exceeded by the annual per capita growth rates in
the functions of public welfare, airports and terminals, public schools, and local
parks and recreation. Since on a per capita basis the annual average growth rate in
" COTrasITT FOR EcONoMIC DEVELOPMENT, op. cit. supra note 64, at 23-24.
"U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 730 (g6o); U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GOVERNMENTAL FINANCES in 1963, at 30 (1964).
0 ADVISORY COIMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, TAX OVERLAPPING IN THE UNITED STATES,
1964, at 8 (x964).
" The SMSA is used here as a proxy measure for a metropolitan area.
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TABLE 2
COMPOSITION OF LOCAL EXPENDITURES OF URBAN AREs, i960
Per Cent Average Annual
Per Capita of Increase in Per
Function Amount Total Capita Amount, 1952-60
Public Schools .............................. $87.88 41.5% 8.6%
Essentially Urban Functions, total ............ 59.13 27.9 5.2
Water supply ............................ 15.21 7.2 5.8
Sewerage ............................... 10.02 4.7 5.9
Fire protection .......................... 8.26 3.9 4.1
Housing and redevelopment ............... 7.80 3.7 1.8
Local parks and recreation ................ 6.31 3.0 8.6
Sanitation .............................. 5.13 2.4 3.0
Airports and terminals .................... 4.28 2.0 9.4
Local libraries ........................... 2.12 1.0 6.2
Other functions, total ....................... 64.96 30.6 6.0
Streets and roads ........................ 19.81 9.3 4.5
Health and hospitals ..................... 11.12 5.2 5.6
Police protection ......................... 11.05 5.2 6.3
Public welfare ........................... 3.87 1.8 9.7
Correction............................ 1.44 .7 6.3
General administration ................... 8.46 4.0 5.6
General public buildings .................. 2.30 1.1 5.4
Miscellaneous and unallocable ............. 6.91 3.3 10.4
Grand Total ............................... 211.97 100.0 6.7
Source.: Manvel, Changing Patterns of Local Urban Ezpendfure, in HOWAD G. ScALLER (ED.), PUBLIC EXPENDITUIIf DECwIONS IN
TE URsM Comu=N" 23 (1963).
urban-generated gross national product was only 2.7 per cent,7 s the urban income
elasticity of each urban expenditure function except housing and redevelopment is
in excess of one. In the case of public welfare, every one per cent increase in per
capita urban income is associated with a 3.6 per cent increase in per capita local urban
spending for this most rapidly growing function.
The probability that local spending will continue to increase at relatively rapid
rates is quite high. The estimates included in the relatively recent statistical studies
on projected state-local spending have all proved to be on the conservative side.
The most recent projections are striking. The National Planning Association esti-
mated state-local spending for 197 o at $94.2 billion or sixty per cent higher than the
196o total. In a report to the President and Congress, the Outdoor Recreation Re-
sources Review Commission forecast total state-local outlays in 1970 of $97.5 billion,
which is about a sixty-seven per cent increase over the actual total in I962.71
" Manvel, Changing Patterns of Local Urban Expenditure, in HowARD G. SCHALLER (ED.), PUBLIC
EXPENDITURE DECISIONS IN THE URBAN COMMUNITY 22 (x963).
f c. OTTO EcxsrIN, TRENDS IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN THE NEXT DECADE (x959); Netzcr, The
Outlook for Fiscal Needs and Resources of State and Local Governments, 48 AM. EcoN. REv. 317-27
(1958); Netzer, Financial Needs and Resources Over the Next Decade: State and Local Governments,
in PUBLIC FINANCES, op. cit. supra note 13, at 23-65; and Papke, Looking Forward in State and Local
Revenues: A Prospective Analysis, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SCHOOL
FINANCE 143-50 (1964).
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Our recent history indicates that federal spending is leveling off somewhat while
local, and especially local urban, spending is increasing rapidly. Excluding drastic
changes on the international scene, one student of government has estimated that
state-local outlays will exceed total federal budgeted expenditures by 1971. State
and local governments already employ 7,500,000 employees compared to only 2,500,000
federal workers.80
The prospects of future urban expenditures seem fairly obvious. Continued
economic growth, urbanization, population growth, and price level changes all point
to rapid rates of growth in urban outlays. Changing institutional patterns mani-
fested in consumer demands for both quantitative and qualitative changes in such
diverse areas as health and hospital care, lower and higher education, sanitation,
housing and urban renewal, police and fire protection, transportation (including
streets, roads, mass transit, and airports), welfare, and such amenities as parks,
recreation facilities, and libraries will be at the root of future rapid increases in
metropolitan area governmental spending.!'
VI
URBAN REVENUES
How will urban governments raise the billions of dollars necessary to meet the
predicted increase in expenditures over the next decade? There are three main
sources of revenue available to the governments in metropolitan areas. After a brief
examination of overall patterns in local revenues, we shall take up in order taxes,
fees, and grants8 2
Table three shows the composition of local governmental revenue for 1946 and
x963. Total revenue, excluding utility, liquor store, and insurance trust receipts, has
increased by 4O per cent since the end of World War II. Despite the fact that
property taxes increased by 310 per cent over the same period of time, this source of
revenue decreased from 57.6 in 1946 to 47.1 per cent of total revenue in 1963. In
the decade of the 192os, property taxes accounted for seventy-five per cent of all
local revenues.
Federal and state grants in aid have increased from 26.1 to 30.8 per cent of total
revenue. The sales and income tax category, which is dominated by sales tax
collections, has increased by 768 per cent since the war, but still only accounts for
4.5 per cent of total revenue. Fee collections have increased by 588 per cent and
constitute 15.4 per cent of total revenues. Disregarding changes in rates of taxation
and increased fees, the elasticity of revenue with respect to Gross National Product
" Anderson, Can the State Live on Crumbs?, Saturday Review, Jan. 9, 1965, P. 3.
e' Manvel, op. cit. supra note 78, at 23-35.
8' Because of the limitation of space, we shall not discuss governmental borrowing. This is, however,
an important area, for state-local debt has increased from 6 to 14% of gross national product during the
postwar era. Between 1946 and 1963 state-local debt has grown by over ii% per year, a striking rate
of growth exceeded only by consumer and mortgage debt.
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TABLE 3
SOURCES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL REVENUE, 1946 AND 1963
(In millions of dollars)
1946 1963
Per Cent Per Cent Per Cent
of of Increase
Sources Amount Total Amount Total 1946-1963
Total Revenue* ................. 88,227 100% $41,218 100.0% 401%
Property Tax .................... 4,737 57.6 19,401 47.1 310
Federal and State Sources ......... 2,145 26.1 12,689 30.8 492
Sales and Income Taxes .......... 216 2.6 1,875 4.5 768
Other Taxes ..................... 204 2.5 888 2.2 335
Fees and Miscellaneous ........... 925 11.2 6,365 15.4 588
*Excludes utility, liquor store, and insurance trust revenues.
Sourca: U.S. BuREU OF Tin CENsUS. HisronIcA SATisTrcs OF THE UNnTD STATEs 729 (19060); U.S. BUnEAU or Ta CrNsus,
Gov .EsnTA. FnTAscns in 1963. at 22 (1964).
is well over one for all categories. The income elasticity coefficients range from
1.7 for property taxes to 4.3 for sales and income taxes. The other revenue categories
fall within this range.
Turning back to table one, we can see, as expected, that those states with large
metropolitan populations have the greatest proportion of total revenue, state aid
revenue, federal aid revenue, and revenue from sources in their own SMSAs. In
twenty-eight states over half of total local revenue is associated with the metropolitan
areas, but in only nineteen states does over half of the state aid to local governments
go to jurisdictions in the SMSAs. In thirty-four, thirty-one, and thirty-three states,
respectively, over half of total federal aid, total local revenue from own sources, and
total local debt are associated with urban governments. Over seventy-four per cent
of all federal aid to local governments, 734 per cent of all local revenue from own
sources, 70.6 per cent of all local expenditures, and 76.6 per cent of all local debt are
associated with governments in metropolitan areas. Yet only sixty-one per cent of
all state aid to local governments is channeled to the SMSAs. These data are con-
sistent with the hypothesis that there is a rural over-representation in the state legis-
latures.
It should be noted that federal aid to local governments amounted to only $685
million in 1962 while state aid to local governments exceeded $io.8 billion. A
significant proportion of state funds, however, are received from the central govern-
ment. Federal grants have increased by over 292 per cent between 1954 and 1965,
and will be fifteen per cent of estimated state and local revenues for 1965."3
Although declining in importance as a revenue source, the property tax has been
and still is the single most important source of revenue for urban governments.
While this source of revenue accounted for only 47.1 per cent of all revenues received
" The Growing Echo in the States' Vaults, Business Week, Sept. i9, 1964, p. 112.
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TABLE 4
LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL REVENUE, DISTRIBUTION BY SOURCE, 1962
School Special Total
Source Counties Municipalities Townships Districts Districts Local
Property tax ......... 45.6% 44.0% 63.8% 51.2% 26.1% 48.0%
Other taxes .......... 3.2 16.1 4.0 .7 - 6.6
Nontax revenue ....... 12.4 19.5 8.4 7.5 53.8 14.9
Intergovernmental .... 38.7 20.4 23.8 40.6 20.1 30.5
Totals ............ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: A vsoar CommisIOoN IrEnEovEnaMENrAL RxLA.TiONS, TAX OVERL&PP INWTHE UNITED STATES, 1964, at 37 (1964).
by local governments in 1963, the property tax as a percent of locally collected
receipts was sixty-eight per cent. In 1962 the property levy amounted to eighty-seven
per cent of local tax revenues. As shown in table four, the property tax is the
major producer of local revenue for counties, municipalities, townships, and school
districts. Only in special districts, which by their nature rely heavily on fees, is the
property tax not the single most important source of receipts.
The large volume of new construction and the rising level of property values and
tax rates have contributed to the increased yield of property taxes. Improved ad-
ministration of the tax has increased the strength of this most important source of
local revenue.8" Since World War II, state legislatures have taken an active interest
in passing legislation designed to improve local property tax programs. Legislation
has been implemented by administrative action. Almost all states maintain a state
agency which supervises local governmental activity in the property tax field. This
activity encompasses equalization, reappraisal, and general information programs.8 5
While a great deal has been accomplished in improving property tax administration
during the past two decades, it is clear that much more can be done to improve the
strength of the tax. 6
Another factor which has contributed to the continuing importance of the
property levy in local finance is its greater than expected responsiveness to changing
levels of aggregate demand, income, and employment s 7 In a pioneering paper
Groves and Kahn derived a long run income elasticity coefficient of .22 for the
property tax in Wisconsin 8 In a later analysis, Netzer used an elasticity co-
efficient of i.oo as the basis for state and local revenue projections8 9 While this
"' Ecker-Racz & Labovitz, Practical Solutions to Financial Problems Created by the Multilevel Political
Structure, in PUBLIC FINANCES, op. cit. supra note 13, at 139.
" Gronouski, State Supervision of Property Tax Administration, io NAT. TAX J. 158-70 (1957).
So THE ADVISORY ComsansIoN ON INTERGOVERNMIENTAL RELATIONS, THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN
STRENGTHENING THE PROPERTY TAX, Vols. I, III (1963).
" See ALVIN H. HANSEN & HARVEY S. PERLOFP, STATE AND LOCAL FINANCE IN THE NATIONAL ECONO,IY
57-58 (1944)-
" Groves & Kahn, The Stability of State and Local Tax Yields, 42 Am. EcoN. REV. 9 o (1952).
" Netzer, Financial Needs and Resources Over the Next Decade: State and Local Governments, in
PUBLIC FINANCES, op. cit. supra note 13, at 30, 38.
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estimate brought forth a chorus of objections, Kurnow has, in an even more recent
paper, presented us with the results of a cross-sectional analysis which tend to support
Netzer. Kurnow points out that the wide differences in estimates between Groves
and Kahn, on the one hand, and Netzer and Kurnow, on othe other, are due
largely to the fact that the latter investigators utilize market value to obtain elasticity
coefficients while the former use assessed value. The Groves-Kahn estimate reflects
actual relative change in tax yields with changes in income rather than the potential
relative change as measured by Netzer and Kurnow 0
As assessment techniques and practices improve and the property tax rolls reflect
more closely real market values, it would appear that the Netzer and Kurnow
estimates would be the most relevant. Where such cases prevail, we can conclude
that the tax is not insensitive to fluctuations in economic activity. We should note,
however, that even if the income elasticity of the property tax is unity, this source
of revenue cannot fulfill projected revenue requirements, for the income elasticity of
local government expenditures is in excess of two.
There are also negative factors working against the strengthening of the property
levy. Vast amounts of property are being removed from the tax rolls as freeways,
expressways, and public parking facilities are constructed." There is also a long-time
lag in the urban renewal program. Large stretches of urban land are now vacant,
either cleared or with varying amounts of rubble awaiting removal.
Property taxes are deductible from federal income tax liabilities. This factor
reduces the net burden on individuals who pay federal income taxes and itemize
their deductions. Corporations also have this advantage. Counterbalancing this
salutary effect on local governmental finances, however, is the fact that under
the doctrine of instrumentalities, local jurisdictions do not tax federal property.
Moreover, the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and other
federal agencies often take title to property acquired but used or held by private
contractors working under the direction of federal agencies. In addition, federal
property sold to private individuals is often withheld from local property tax rolls
until payments for the property are completed. These continuing cases along with
the basic stock of federal governmental property represent a significant part of total
property in the United States. The current market value of federal property is not
known, although the accumulated historical cost of federal property has been esti-
mated in excess of $2oo billion in i958.92
In addition to the immunity of federal property, local governments must also
contend with the tax exempt properties of religious, educational, and nonprofit
organizations as well as state governments. While we do not know the market
90 Kurnow, On the Elasticity of the Real Property Tax, x8 J. FINANCE 56-58 (1963).
9 1 Brazer, The Role of Major Metropolitan Centers in State and Local Finance, 48 AM. EcoN. REv.
308 (x958).
"' Ecker-Racz & Labovitz, Practical Solutions to Financial Problems Created by the Multilevel Political
Structure, in PUBLiC FINANCES, op. cit. supra note 13, at 139-41.
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value of all this property, it seems clear that the financial affairs of local governments
are significantly affected by the many exclusions of property from the tax rolls.
Another factor that may prove to have a negative effect on property tax yields
in the core cities is the changing relative income levels of its residents. Demographic
and economic changes may bring falling relative income levels which could be a
causal factor in the decline in the value of residential property on a per capita basis. 3
Table Three indicates that nonproperty taxes have been increasing in importance
relative to property taxes.94 This fact has been discernible since the i92os, but it has
only been since World War II that the absolute amount of nonproperty taxes has
grown to be a significant part of total tax revenues. Nonproperty taxes increased
from three to twelve per cent of total tax revenues between 1927 and 1962, but the
most rapid rate of growth occurred between 1945 and 1950.
The ratio of local nonproperty taxes to total local taxes varies widely among the
states. In 1962 this ratio ranged from .5 per cent in Indiana to 44.2 per cent in
Alabama. The ratio in the District of Columbia was sixty-three per cent. The
ratio was less than five per cent in seventeen states, between five and ten per cent
in thirteen states, between ten and fifteen per cent in six states, between fifteen and
twenty per cent in four states, and over twenty per cent in eleven states. Except for
the New England states, most of the highly urbanized states have a ratio of ten
per cent or higher. There is a relatively high positive rank correlation between city
size and the ratio of nonproperty taxes to total city taxes collected. The cities of Phila-
delphia, Washington, St. Louis, New Orleans, Kansas City, Columbus, Louisville, and
Toledo each collected over half of their tax receipts from nonproperty levies in
1962. In the same year New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles each received over
thirty-five per cent of their total taxes from nonproperty tax source 0 5
Several reasons have been advanced to explain the increased use of nonproperty
taxes. They are: (I) the desire to find alternatives to the property tax when it is
shared by overlapping jurisdictions, (2) tax diversification for its own sake, (3) tax
equity, (4) the alleged deleterious effects on the location of business as result of
increased property tax ratio, and (5) dissatisfaction with the administration of the
property tax 6
The major nonproperty levies are sales, income, and license taxes. The most
important is the sales tax. This source of revenue accounted for 57.8 per cent of
nonproperty tax receipts in 1962. New York City and New Orleans adopted general
retail sales taxes before World War II, but it was not until 1945, when cities in
California started to use this levy, that the revolution in local retail sales taxation
"' Brazer, supra note 9z, at 309.
04 For a general view of local nonproperty taxes, see Doherty, Greater Use of Nonproperty Tax
Sources, and McBride, State-Administered Local Taxes, Shared Taxes, and Grants in Aid, both in PRo-
CEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL Tax AssociATioN io6-ia8 (1958).
OrADVIsoRY ComcaussloN ON INTERGOVERNMtENTAL RIELATIONS, TAX OVERLAPPING IN THE UNiTE
STATES 1964, at 49-50 (1964).
" Id. at 42.
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really began. Within a decade almost 200 California municipalities had general
sales tax ordinances.9 By 1962 approximately 2,ooo local governments in twelve
states imposed general retail sales taxes. Most of these governments were munici-
palities located in Illinois, California, and MississippiY
Cities in Alaska, New York, and Virginia levy general sales taxes even though
their states do not use this source of revenue. These cities levy and administer their
own taxes. Municipalities in four other states levy and administer their own taxes
despite the fact that their states also have sales tax collection and other administrative
facilities. In Illinois, California, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Utah local sales taxes
are added to the state tax and the state collects and remits revenue to the local govern-
mentsf 9  Normally the state and local tax bases are identical. In Illinois and
California, which contain approximately seventy-five per cent of all local sales
taxing jurisdictions in the United States, county areas also employ the sales tax.' 00
There is, therefore, no incentive for buyers to avoid the tax by shopping outside of
municipalities.
Urban governments also employ a variety of excise or selective sales taxes. The
most remunerative of these is the levy on public utility services. Local taxes on
alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, and motor fuel are being adopted by an
increasing number of communities. 1 1
There are several alleged advantages of sales taxation. Thomas Hobbes, J. S.
Mill, Alfred Marshall, Irving Fisher, A. C. Pigou, and Luigi Einaudi all favored
the levy because it taxes an individual in accordance to what he removes rather than
what he contributes to net national product.0 2 On a less philosophical level, the
advantages are: (i) revenue productivity, (2) relative ease of administration, (3)
relatively low cost of administration, and the fact that (4) it can be used to extract
revenue from certain municipal residents and nonresident individuals who use city
services but who would not otherwise contribute revenue, and (5) that it is a stable
source of revenue. Bits of evidence and a priori reasoning tend to affirm the first
four points,103 but the data negate the hypothesis that the tax provides a stable
source of revenue.?0 4
0 Davies, First Decade of Municipal Sales Taxation in California, s8 Am. J. ECONOMICS AND
SOcIOLOGY 49-54 (i958)-
08 ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
RESRICTioNs ON LocA. TAXING PowES 75 (1962); ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, LOCAL NONPROPERTY TAXES AND THE COORDINATING ROLE OF THE STATE 34 (ig6i).
" ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, TAX OVERLAPPING IN THE UNITED
STATES, Op. cit. supra note 95, at 47.
"'°ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, LocAL NONPROPERTY TAXES AND
THE COORDINATING ROLE OF THE STATE 34 (1961).1011d. at 33-36; and ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITU-
TIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LocAL TAxING POWERS 78 (1962).
105 See NICHoLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX II (955); IRVING FISHER & HERDERT V. FISHER,
CONSTRUCTIVE INCOME TAXATION 24-27 (1942).
.03 Davies, Use of Local Retail Sales Taxes, 32 WESTERN CITY 34-35 (1956).
" Davies, The Sensitivity of Consumption Taxes to Fluctuations in Income, x5 NAT. TAx J. 281-90
(1962).
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Since 1946 local sales tax revenues have increased by over 700 per cent which is a
larger increase than any other source of revenue. The ratio of sales levies to total
nonproperty taxes grew from 43.6 to 57.8 per cent between 1946 and 1963. Although
the ratio of sales tax revenues to total tax revenues was only seven per cent in 1963,
it was but four per cent in 1946Y5
There is a good positive correlation between per capita sales tax revenues and
city size. Per capita sales tax receipts ranged from $244 in cities of less than
50,000 population to $36.38 per capita in municipalities with over a million in-
habitants. The percentage of our largest cities employing the tax is greater than
for any other city size classification. It is interesting to note that per capita property
tax receipts in cities with over one million residents is $94.94 in 1963.
Total municipal sales tax collections were $14 billion in 1963. These collections
amounted to approximately 23.3 per cent of municipal property taxes and 16.9 per
cent of total city taxes1 6 The data tend to support the hypothesis that local sales
taxes are primarily a municipal phenomenon, and the experience of the last two
decades seems to indicate that municipal sales taxes will continue to grow in rela-
tive importance as well as absolute size.
Municipal income taxes represent 12.1 per cent of all nonproperty taxes. Phila-
delphia adopted an income tax in 1939, but like the sales tax, it was not until after
the war that broad permissive legislation permitted widespread use of the income
levy. Pennsylvania's famous "tax anything" law permitted cities, boroughs, town-
ships, and school districts to use this source of revenue.07  By i96o over i,Too
Pennsylvania taxing districts used the levy. In Ohio over sixty cities and villages
had adopted municipal income tax ordinances by i962.1°8 Cities in Kentucky,
Missouri, Alabama,0 9 and Michigan also use the tax. Detroit is the most recent
large city to adopt the levy."0
Most municipal income taxes are levied only on so-called "earned income."
Rent, dividends, interest, and capital gains are commonly excluded from the tax
base. The rates of taxation are constant, usually at one per cent, regardless of the
level of income."' Most ordinances allow no personal exemptions or deductions." 2
In effect, most local income levies are flat rate taxes on gross wages.
"' U.S. BUR.AU OF THE CENSUS, GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1963, at 22 (1964); ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, TAx OVER.APPING IN THE UNITED STATES, x964, at 22 (1964).
100 U.S. BUREAU O THE CENSUS, COPI rMonl, OF CITY GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN x963, at 6-7 (1964).
1 0 7 T-E ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, TAX OVERLAPPING IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1964, at 45 (1964).
0 ADVISORY CoMMIuSSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
R.ESTRICTIoNs ON LOCAL TA XING POWERS 8& (1962).
... Ecker-Racz & Labovitz, Practical Solutions to Financial Problems Created by the Multilevel
Political Structure, in PUBLIC FINANCES, op. cit. supra note 13, at 144.
110 ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL TAXING PowERs 89 (1962).
" The fact that the tax rate is constant does not necessarily mean that the municipal income levy is
a proportional tax.
.. Taylor, Local Income Taxes After Twenty-One Years, 15 NAT. TAX J. 113, 115 (1962).
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One of the main arguments advanced in favor of the tax is its revenue pro.
ductivity. On the basis of the few studies made, the evidence tends to support the
revenue productivity hypothesis.' 13 Another alleged advantage is the ability it gives
the core city to tax nonresidents who work in the central city and use its services.
A questionable corollary of this alleged advantage is the provision of an economic
incentive for suburbs to incorporate with the core city. The cost of administering
municipal income taxes is relatively low, ranging between two and five per cent of
total revenue collected. Withholding taxes at the source accounts for between
seventy and eighty per cent of total income tax collections. This factor helps to
keep governmental costs of collection low." 4
The municipal income tax is not without disadvantages. The fact that the
geographical boundaries of local taxing jurisdictions (or any taxing jurisdiction) are
not coterminous with economic activity raises serious problems with the relatively
few cities that tax corporate incomes. Multiple outlet firms with intra- and interstate
facilities create income over broad geographical areas. The question of where the
income is earned and, therefore, how much is taxable in the taxing city is almost
unanswerable." 5 The use of allocation formulae has not been conspicuously success-
ful at the state level of administration.
Another disadvantage of the income tax arises because of the balkanization of
local governments within a metropolitan area. If both the central city and the
suburb adopt income tax ordinances, the suburbanite who works in the central city
may be subject to double taxation of his income. Where there are reciprocal agree-
ments between jurisdictions, the worker normally pays the tax to the government
of his residence and receives a tax credit in the jurisdiction where he earns income.
Reciprocal agreements usually prevent the central city from taxing daytime residents
who live in suburbs." 6
Another disadvantage of the tax is its alleged effect of driving large taxpayers
out of the taxing jurisdiction. There is no strong evidence one way or the other
on this hypothesis. It should be noted that the data available seem to indicate that
municipal taxes appear to be more substitutable than complementary to other taxes.
If this is true, it is doubtful that one would observe any significant emigration from
taxing municipalities.
Although officials in Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Fort Worth,
Minneapolis, New York, and San Francisco have seriously considered local income
taxes," -7 it does not appear that this source of revenue will grow in importance in
the near future. Local income taxes produced $308 million in 1962. Income tax
... Id. at ii6-,8.
1
'Id. at 118-23.
... Brazer, The Role of Major Metropolitan Centers in State and Local Finance, 48 At. EcoN. REV.
309-II (1958).
... Buehler, Revenue Improvements Under Present Laws and Government Structure, in FINfANCINO
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT 209-10 (1955).
""'Taylor, supra note 112, at 114.
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collections increased by over fourteen times between i942 and 1962, but in each
biennium over these two decades income tax revenues remained at only one per cent
of total local tax revenues 8
Taxes other than property, income, and sales levies accounted for 2.z per cent
of total local revenue in 1963. They increased by 335 per cent between 1946 and
1963 and were responsible for about 30.1 per cent of all nonproperty tax revenue
in 1962.
The most important part of this category, called "other taxes" by the Census
Bureau, is the license tax. In 1963 license levies on motor vehicles, building equip-
ment permits, and other business operations represented five per cent of total taxes
and 14.6 per cent of nonproperty taxes in the largest forty-three cities in the United
States. The entire category "other taxes" comprised only 16.9 per cent of non-
property revenues for the forty-three cities." 9 This source of revenue is a much
less important nonproperty revenue producer in these forty-three cities with popu-
lations of 300,000 or more than other smaller local governments. Conversely, sales
and income taxes are much more important to these large urban centers.
Although localities in all fifty states use "other taxes,' 20 it does not appear that
they will grow significantly in importance in the near future. While they increased
from approximately $2oo million to $888 million between 1946 and 1963, they pro-
duced four per cent of total tax revenue in both 1946 and 1963.121
Despite the fact that local governments in some states have achieved a measure
of fiscal independence under home rule provisions, certain statutory, constitutional,
and charter provisions have severely restricted the use of nonproperty taxes. These
restrictions vary from outright prohibition to specifications with respect to type of
locality, extent of the tax base, and the maximum rates allowable' 2 2 Even so, most
students of local public finance seem to be quite bullish concerning the future
prospects of local nonproperty taxes. The author of a recent study predicted that
the ratio of nonproperty to total local tax revenue will increase to twenty-five per
cent by 197 o, but as Thompson notes, this seems to be a particularly sanguine view
in light of the fact that there was no appreciable change in this ratio during the
195o decade.' 23
A survey of local taxes should include mention of the equity effects of taxes, but
this is still an open question. The weight of the partial evidence we do have indicates
"
1
' ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, TAX OVERLAPPING IN THE UNITED
STATES 1964, at 43 (1964).
"" U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COMPENDIUM OF CITY GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN x963, at 78-93
(1964).
'"o ADVIsORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATU-
TORY RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL TAXING POWERS 76-77 (1962).
"'
1 
THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, TAX OVERLAPPING IN THE UNITED
STATES 1964, at 43 (1964).
.. THE ADVISORY COMIISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RESTRIUCTIONS ON LOCAL TAXING POWERS 79-82 (1962).
.. See WILBUR R. THOMPSON, A PREFACE TO URBAN ECONOmICS 245 (1963).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
that the whole structure of state-local taxes is mildly regressive in nature. 24 Among
other factors this conclusion is based on the acceptance of the criterion that annual
earned income is the "proper" standard upon which to adjudge the regressivity,
proportionality, or progressivity of a tax. Other criteria, however, have been shown
to be equally defensible.'25
Even where there is agreement on the appropriate criterion, there is no agreement
on whether the property tax is regressive or proportional.' 26 Moreover, there is no
agreement on whether the sales tax is regressive, proportional, or progressive.127 The
fragmented evidence on municipal income taxes is also inconclusive. Taylor has
argued that local income taxes are proportional. 28 Musgrave's empirical study
shows that state-local income taxes are mildly progressive,120 while G. A. Bishop's
statistical analysis reveals that state and local income taxes manifest both regressivity
and progressivity depending on the income classes compared.130
Equity questions are no doubt important. Indeed, Galbraith may be correct when
he states that due to equity considerations the modern liberal has been the effective
enemy of better education, sewer systems, parks, and recreational facilities.' 8 '
All empirical studies of the equity impact of taxes are, however, based on hy-
potheses which are behavioral in nature, but largely untested. This state of affairs
will continue for some time because a quantitative measurement of the incidence of
a tax will require, among other things, an econometric analysis of literally millions
of supply and demand functions.
Fee, service, or user charges are a second general source of revenue for urban
governments. They are defined as "amounts received from the public for the per-
121 Cf. HANSEN & PErLOFF, op. cit. supra note 87, at 35; Musgrave, The Incidence ol the Tax Structure
and Its Effects on Consumption, STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON TAX POLICY OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM.,
84T1 CONG., isr SESS., FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY (PAPERS SUBMIITTED
BY PANELISTS APPEAING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON TAX POLICY 96 ff. (Comm. Print 1955) [hereinafter
cited as FEDERAL TAx POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY]; Bishop, The Tax Burden by
Income Class, 14 NAT. TAx J. 54 (i961).
"'
5 See Davies, Commodity Taxation and Equiity, z6 J. oF FINANCE 581-90 (zg6x), and note 102
supra.
1L0 Cf. Bishop, supra note 124, at 54: HAROLD GROVES, FINANCING GOVERNMENT 64-65 (1964); JOHN
F. DUE, GOVERNMENT FINANCE 368-69 (1963); JAMES N. MORGAN AND OTHERS, INCOME AND WELFARE IN
THE UNITED STATES C. i9 (1962); and Musgrave, The Incidence of the Tax Structure and Its ELfects on
Consumption, in FEDaRAL TAx POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY, Op. cit. supra note 124, at
98 ff.
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formance of specific services benefiting the person charged and from sales of com-
modities."'132 Contrasted with taxes, fees are voluntary rather than compulsory
contributions to government.
Service charges are utilized by municipalities in association with providing a wide
variety of goods and services. A partial list includes: education, health and hospitals,
housing, sanitation, nonhighway transportation, highways, parks and recreation,
libraries, police, and fire protection.33  If all local governments are considered (in-
cluding school districts), education ranks first as the producer of revenues from
fees. It accounts for twenty-six per cent of all user charges. 3 4  In our forty-three
largest cities, however, over thirty per cent of the total revenue collected from fees
in 1963 was due to housing-urban renewal and sewerage charges' 35
The most common methods of determining the magnitude of a fee or price are
cost of service and the "welfare principle." Under the first method the price is set
on the basis of either the average or marginal cost of producing the service.' 36
Given the following conditions: (i) that the current distribution of income is
regarded as acceptable, (2) that the marginal cost of producing the good or service
includes marginal social costs, (3) that the independence hypothesis holds, and (4)
that prices are roughly equal to marginal costs in the other sectors of the economy,
then fees should be set on the basis of marginal costs in order to achieve an optimum
allocation of resources 1ST
The so-called "welfare" criterion of pricing bases the price on ability to pay which
usually means the level of an individual's current earned income. The lower a
person's income, the lower the price. There is, then, a direct positive correlation
between the price charged and the level of a person's income.'3 8 There is an element
of subsidization under "welfare" pricing' 39
In a study of fees in Los Angeles, Stockfish revealed that due to underpricing
there were significant amounts of "subsidy in kind" to certain area residents. He
claims that by setting an appropriate set of prices, the city of Los Angeles could
have raised enough additional money to finance over forty per cent of its annual
expenditures 40
The case for using fees is strong if: (I) there would be significant waste if the
good or service has a zero price, (2) the utility flowing from the good or service
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accrues primarily to the individual purchaser, and (3) the cost of collecting the user
charge is not excessive. 141 Fees provide a relatively certain source of revenue, can
be altered to reflect changes in consumer demand, and the revenue is not restricted
to certain projects. 42
The appropriate area for market pricing in the governmental sector may be a
relatively small one.'3 Yet a very good case can be made for the use of certain
service charges in the general area of governmental finance.144 Between 1946 and
1963 local governmental fee revenues increased by approximately 588 per cent, second
only to the sales tax as the most rapidly growing source of local revenue. In 1963
fees were 15.4 per cent of total revenues and over twenty-two per cent of total locally
derived revenues. On the basis of its history during the most recent two decades,
the prospects for market pricing in the urban public sector appears to be quite bright.
The third general source of revenue to urban governments is the grant in aid.
There are two basic types of grants, conditional and block grants. The former are
given for a particular purpose and are subject to supervision and control. All federal
grants in the United States are of this nature. Block grants are general unallocated
grants with no restrictions on the use of the money as long as it is used for a public
purpose. 45
There are two basic ways to distribute conditional grants. One way is to allocate
funds in accordance with a formula which only takes into consideration the "needs"
and not the income or wealth of the receiving jurisdiction. An educational grant,
for example, may be based only on the number of pupils in average daily atten-
dance 40 The alternative basis for the distribution of conditional grants requires a
matching contribution of some proportional amount from the receiving jurisdiction.
The proportions can vary depending on the purposes and wishes of the granting
government.' 47
Grants to local governments increased by almost 500 per cent between 1946 and
1963. They constituted $12.7 billion or almost thirty-one per cent of total local
receipts in 1963. The great bulk of grant funds to municipalities come directly from
state governments. Federal grants given directly to local governments (mostly
urban governments) amounted to only $89o million in 1963, but the increase between
1962 and 1963 was approximately thirty per cent. Recent political developments
indicate that direct federal grants to urban governments will continue to increase
rapidly.
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Data based on a study of the 1957 Census of Governments show that the share
of metropolitan area expenditures financed by intergovernmental aids vary widely
among the municipalities. Grants on a per capita basis varied from $i 5 to $70 per
person in urban governments. Welfare grants contribute significantly to this wide
variation. Grants per capita do not correlate with the level of local expenditures' 4
This same study revealed that fifty-six per cent of federal and state aid was dis-
tributed to the SMSAs. The SMSAs contained approximately seventy per cent of
our population at that time. 49 The data underlying table one in this paper indi-
cate that the fifty-six per cent figure for 1957 has now increased to approximately
sixty-two per cent. In 1957 approximately fifty-five per cent of state grants and
seventy-three per cent of direct federal grants to local governments went to the
metropolitan areas. These figures were sixty-one and seventy-five per cent, re-
spectively, in I962 °o All of the recent available evidence indicates that both state
and direct federal grants to urban governments will increase significantly during
the next several years.
CONCLUSION
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, it seems proper to mention that
many alternative plans have been advanced to cope with the financial problems
existing in metropolitan governments. These range from the increased use of
contractual agreements among governments to the institution of federal corporations
for metropolitan areas,' 5' from annexation and consolidation to the use of extra-
territorial powers, from voluntary metropolitan councils to the urban county, and
from city-county separation to city-county consolidation. 15 2
All of these plans seem to have merit, yet it is clear that we are painfully ignorant
when it comes to analyzing and explaining the urban scene. We lack funda-
mental knowledge.'53 It may, in the face of the rapidly rising expectations of the
urban population, seem trite and anachronistic to make a plea for more basic and
applied research on metropolitan problems' 4 But that is exactly what is required
if rational, albeit temporary, solutions are to be found for urban problems.
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